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Most of us believe that the mad are “mentally” ill, having a disease of the brain, either
psycho-chemical or neurobiological in nature. This view is shared widely, by professionals in the
field, and popularized in books, films, and other media. Professional diagnosis by psychiatrists of
the various disorders is based on behavioral symptoms, as defined and classified by the American
Psychiatric Association Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 5th Edition1 (DSM-
5). Much of the behavior of those aﬄicted with a mental disorder, by definition, is not rational. But,
could it be?
In his second book in a series (Figure 1), Matthew Blakeway contends that madness is
indeed logical in structure. This assertion derives from his view (see Blakeway, 2014) that
our brains are biological computers with algorithms for action based on emotional drivers.
However, humans can out-think their biology by calculating an action to achieve an emotional
goal (either current or future). This requires an understanding of the emotion involved
and this is achieved by observing behavior. But what if that behavior has been modified
by tactical deception (pretence)? This results in a misunderstanding of emotions, and leads
to self-destructive actions. Humans perform tactical deception all the time. For example,
how many of us would frequent a café or restaurant without being greeted with a friendly
smile? The calculation is correct, but the input is faulty. Is the waitress really happy to
see us, or would she rather be elsewhere? Blakeway places mental illness within the same
framework, and argues that mental illness is simply self-destruction of a higher order of
complexity.
Blakeway takes us on a historical journey of our understanding of madness from an aﬄiction
sent by God as punishment for our moral faults, to Freud’s psychological theories of relationships
and developmental frameworks, and the current understandings of neurological/biological
causes with notions of “illness.” Cures for illness are dependent on causal theories. The
point Blakeway makes is that we have no idea about the causal structure of the symptoms
that are being treated. Psychopharmacological cures work, but we don’t know why. They
have an added bonus: drugs are cheap to administer compared with asylums, psychoanalysis,
or psychotherapy. Szasz (1961) comes to mind here, although Blakeway believes madness
is more than a myth, or social construct (Foucault, 2006). He contends that the particular
behavioral pattern exhibited by the “mad” is dependent on the specific combination of
inputs. It is rational behavior in response to a compound misunderstanding of various
emotions.
1American Psychiatric Association (2013). Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 5th Edn. Arlington, VA:
American Psychiatric Publishing.
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The starting point of Blakeway’s theory is a basic algorithm
that converts an emotion into an action that optimizes
biological fitness. Depending upon the circumstances, an
action state is driven by the emotion having the highest
calculated value. He divides emotions into four categories,
basic survival (e.g., fear, hunger), reproductive (e.g., lust,
jealousy), social (e.g., guilt, anger), and strategic (e.g., anxiety,
regret). Most of these biologically derived emotions are shared
with other animals, especially chimpanzees, although there is
the question of whether other animals can perform tactical
manipulation with intent. Humans can do so, which leads
to misconceptions of emotion that become quite complex
depending on whether we are performing the deception or
someone else.
Blakeway separates mental disorders into three categories
that overlap nicely with those of the DSM-5: compulsions
(neuroses), impulsions (acute personality disorders), and
delusions (psychoses), and he explains theoretically how
and why they might occur. Set out in a series of tables and
textual examples, he pulls apart the various emotional drivers
and inhibitors that can lead to very different outcomes. He
demonstrates how compulsions occur because two emotions
get confused, and one becomes replaced by another. For
example, if hunger (an emotional driver), was misinterpreted
as shame (an inhibitor), then the appearance of food would
lead to the suppression of the urge to eat, and in extreme
cases, anorexia nervosa. As Blakeway notes, current medical
opinion is that low self-esteem is a symptom of anorexia nervosa,
but this could just as easily be the result of the systematic
affectation of shame. This same mechanism can work in another
way. If emotional inhibitors (e.g., shame) are confused, and
act as drivers, this results in “libertine compulsions” where
actions that should be suppressed (such as child molestation)
become compulsions. Depression is an interesting case where
all of the driving emotions “flatline,” so there is no desire to
do anything. Like alcoholism, it is the aftermath (e.g., loss
of relationships) that is the problem, not the action state
itself.
Mental illness and criminality are closely connected. Prisons
have an alarming number of people characterized with
antisocial personality disorder, seen by Blakeway as a “proactive
impulsion” resulting in the misidentification of shame as anger
(a humiliation-revenge driver) resulting in an unprovoked
attack on someone. Similarly, fear is the natural expressed
emotion in situations of physical abuse, however, if flight
is impossible and fear is suppressed, it can be mistaken
for shame, leading to what Blakeway calls a “deviant anti-
impulsion.” Thoughts can operate in the same way without the
actual physical stimulus being present, and without biological
brain dysfunctions. There is a strong correlation between
dopamine and schizophrenia. Dopamine release is usually
taken as causal, but what if it’s the other way round?
What if you can trick the brain into releasing dopamine,
which is a pain inhibitor producing a feeling of euphoria?
Being “away with the fairies” is perhaps not such a strange
euphemism.
Blakeway has created a model of self-destructive complex
action states that we commonly called “madness.” This is a
provocative and radical new way of thinking, and one that
deserves our attention. It opens the door to new therapies
that specifically target the corrupted emotions. This could lead
to better psychiatric care of the “mentally ill,” diminish drug
therapies, and start to replace them with talk therapies combined
with targeted cognitive re-training. These ideas should be given
careful consideration if we are to provide the best help possible
for those who need it the most.
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